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Foreword 
This working paper was originally prepared as a contribution to the Reconciliation Australia 
Banking Workshop in Sydney in May 2002. CAEPR worked closely with Reconciliation 
Australia on the planning for this workshop, which focused on the delivery of banking and 
financial services to Indigenous communities The proceedings of the workshop will be 
published later this year on CD Rom by Reconciliation Australia. In the meantime, the 
circulation of this workshop contribution as a CAEPR Working Paper aims to make it 
readily available to a potentially wider and different audience. 
The remaining three papers contributed to the Banking Workshop by CAEPR staff and 
Centre Associate are also to be published in the Working Paper series on this website. They 
are 
• ‘The spatial context of Indigenous service delivery’, by John Taylor (CAEPR Working 
Paper No. 16). 
• ‘The potential use of tax incentives for Indigenous businesses on Indigenous land’ by 
Owen Stanley (CAEPR Working Paper No. 17). 
• ‘Banking on Indigenous communities: Issues, options, and Australian and international 
best practice’, by Siobhan McDonnell and Neil Westbury (Reconciliation Australia) 
(CAEPR Working Paper No. 18). 
In September 2002, CAEPR prepared a submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Corporations and Financial Services Inquiry into the Level of Banking and Financial 
Services in Rural, Regional and Remote Areas of Australia. This submission  
will be available at the Parliamentary Joint Committee’s website 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/corporations_ctte/index.htm>. The Inquiry’s 
terms of reference focus on options for making additional banking services available to 
rural and regional communities; options for expansion of banking facilities through non-
traditional channels; the level of service currently available to rural and regional residents; 
and international experiences and policies designed to enhance and improve the quality of 
rural banking services. 
The publication of CAEPR’s inputs to the Banking and Financial Services Workshop 
address important issues of public policy. Access to consumer and business banking 
services remains a fundamental precursor to enhanced economic futures for Indigenous 
communities in today’s world. These papers outline some of the fundamental, but diverse, 
actions that are needed to address the current banking and financial service delivery 
shortfalls currently experienced by many Indigenous communities and people. 
Professor Jon Altman 
Director, CAEPR 
October 2002 
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Abstract 
This is an exploratory ideas paper that sets out to consider how real development futures 
might be financed and delivered to Indigenous people, especially those residing in rural and 
remote regions. These are places where there are limited conventional development 
opportunities—where development is and is going to be costly—but where demographic 
projections, cultural imperatives and history indicate Indigenous people will be living in 50 
to 100 years time. These are also places where a very high proportion of land is owned by 
Indigenous people, generally under inalienable title, and often (even if tradable) has a low 
market value. The issue addressed is how can existing institutions and statutory and non-
statutory policy frameworks be used by Indigenous interests to strategically leverage 
development capital. This issue is especially critical under current circumstances when 
governments appear reluctant to recognise communal Indigenous rights and interests and 
market failure, and instead focus increasingly on the individual and the market, in accord 
with the dominant ideology of development. Simultaneously, there is evidence of a 
corporate banking retreat from commercially marginal regions. What strategic pressure 
might Indigenous interests exert to reverse such a trend? 
Introduction 
‘Indigenous Australia’ is a diverse analytical concept made up of about 400,000 individuals 
in very many different social groupings. A fundamental problem in delivering economic 
development opportunity to this entity is that, while a great range of policy instruments and 
options are available, resources are invariably inadequate given the extent of the 
development challenge. Furthermore, the overarching policy framework is fundamentally 
‘developmental’ (economic assimilation), without necessarily being appropriate to 
Indigenous aspirations (when articulated), or sustainable, given the particularities of 
Indigenous circumstances. 
The economic problems of Indigenous Australia are highly variable: 
• some are a function of historical legacy—dispossession, exclusion, marginalisation, 
racism; 
• others are a function of a combination of this historical legacy, as well as location and 
scale; and  
• others still are a function of all of the above factors, as well as cultural persistence and 
resistance of robust customary institutions poorly adapted to economic development (in 
a market sense). 
Discerning the relative role of access to finance in delivering economic development 
opportunities to Indigenous Australia is a complex task given this diversity. Furthermore, 
as with policy frameworks, the mainstream financial system is predicated on the currently 
dominant neo-liberal ideology of development. This ideology is not necessarily shared by 
Indigenous people, many of whom understand the trade-offs between their social capital 
and the mainstream’s are a lot better than many policy makers and politicians—white and 
black—wish to acknowledge. At times there is opposition to development. 
Other highly generalised background factors further complicate an assessment of the role 
of business finance in the delivery of Indigenous economic development. Most of these can 
be viewed as countervailing trends. I note just five of relevance to the issues raised in this 
paper: 
• With enhanced globalisation these is some evidence of a growing geographic duality: 
prospering commercial centres along the southeast seaboard and an economically 
declining regional and remote hinterland (see Gray & Lawrence 2001). Indigenous 
Australians are disproportionately represented in the latter (Taylor 2002). 
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• Globalisation is assumed to result in economic and cultural acquiescence to the 
market, but there is evidence of Indigenous cultural resistance and persistence, 
especially in remote regions.1 
• Globalisation is creating a tension in the corporate sector between the prerogative of 
short-term competitiveness and profitability versus longer-term strategic and global 
competitive advantage. 
• A growth in the Indigenous land base in the underdeveloped hinterland, based on land 
rights and native title (see Pollack 2001), that deliver customary use rights, but not 
exclusive property rights in commercially valuable resources. Meanwhile, Indigenous 
population and residence on the Indigenous estate is likely to grow. 
• There is a growing distinction between the expanding ‘new’ economy based on high tech 
innovation and the stagnating ‘old’ economy based on resource exploitation. 
Government industry support and concessions by States and Territories are oriented to 
the former, based on the principle of supporting innovation. Indigenous market 
engagements are currently perceived to be with the latter, but may in fact be in missing 
or future markets and deserving of support on the basis of market failure. 
A brief policy history 
It is probably unnecessary to extend Aboriginal affairs policy history further back than 
1972, arguably the start of the modern policy era. The fundamental economic policy 
framework over the past 30 years has been based on a somewhat old-fashioned view of 
economics—Indigenous economic disadvantage will be eliminated or ameliorated in one of 
two broad ways: 
(a) socioeconomic backlogs will be addressed by additional doses of services, which have 
never been adequately delivered, and/or 
(b) economic development opportunities will be provided by restitution of factor 
endowments, mainly land and capital, with human capital (education) being part of (a). 
This broad two-pronged approach was comprehensively articulated in the Miller Report on 
Aboriginal Employment and Training Programs in 1985; incorporated in the Aboriginal 
Employment Development Policy (1988–93); and subsequently updated in a number of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) documents such as ‘Policies and 
Strategies for Achieving Economic Equality for Indigenous Australians’ (1996), ‘Pathways to 
Sustained Economic Development for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ (1997) 
and ‘Getting on with Business’ (1998), as well as in John Herron’s ‘Removing the Welfare 
Shackles’ (1998a) and ‘Beyond Welfare’ (1998b). 
Many of these policy statements since the early 1980s have articulated an important role 
for business in generating Indigenous economic development. Sometimes this role was 
crudely articulated in terms of policy goals of business (that is, self-employment) equality 
between Indigenous and other Australians.2 At other times there was a more sophisticated 
recognition that, in the absence of vibrant labour markets in remote regions, an economic 
base will need to be established (Miller 1985). 
To simplify considerably, these policies generally proposed two types of Indigenous 
business entity: 
• micro business that includes self-employment and family business, and  
• micro to small business that is owned, in whole or in part, by an Indigenous 
corporation, usually in the community sector.  
The two entities are not discrete sets and there is clearly considerable overlap between self-
employment and enterprise within what is often referred to as the Indigenous community 
sector. To differentiate though, Indigenous self-employed usually face similar challenges to 
other Australians in establishing a small business. It is just that for them, historical legacy, 
and in some situations cultural continuities, make the hurdles far greater. It is the latter 
form of business enterprise that differs most from mainstream forms. Indigenous corporate 
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business faces greater challenges precisely because it is located with the Indigenous 
community sector, a sector that is often poorly socially and spatially defined, and hence 
contested, and where property rights may be equally murky in definition.  
This paper will largely focus on the latter more problematic and complicated form of 
business development and on issues linked to the provision of capital, grants and loans for 
Indigenous investment. However, many of the issues raised will also be applicable to self-
employment in the Indigenous community sector. 
Some avenues for generating Indigenous finance for development 
As a group, Indigenous Australians are income and asset poor and face a number of 
additional disadvantages—low education status, communications problems, relative social 
and geographic isolation, and a land base that is often communally owned and legally 
inalienable. Consequently, and not surprisingly, they face problems in gaining access to 
finance for development. Part of the policy response has been to provide special sources of 
finance for Indigenous development, although it is arguable whether these special sources 
in fact outweigh potential mainstream (banking sector) sources. Under such circumstances, 
it is clearly important that any available levers are used to generate development finance, 
where economic development is a shared community aspiration. In this section, an effort 
will be made to briefly outline Indigenous-specific sources of finance, levers that are 
available to generate special additional finance, and some options for using these levers to 
engage more creatively with the financial sector.  
As already noted, the emphasis here will be on finance for community-based enterprise 
development. It is assumed, by and large, that development finance will be sought in 
situations where Indigenous comparative advantage has been identified to generate a 
commercially viable (not risk-free!) development outcome. The discussion will be 
embellished, here and there, with brief case study material (boxed) garnered from a 
personal research engagement with these issues over the past 20 years. While finance 
opportunity will be highlighted in this section, inhibitors will be discussed in the next. 
The financial asset base 
Incrementally over the years, and in recognition of the limits of the Indigenous asset (or 
wealth) base, a number of institutions have been established since the early 1970s to 
facilitate Indigenous access to finance or to assist in accumulating financial resources for 
the current and future benefits of Indigenous Australians. The institutions that I describe 
here are limited to what could be termed the top five, three of which have national 
constituencies and two that have state/territory jurisdictions: 
1. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) is an independent 
statutory authority with an annual budget (2000–01) exceeding $1 billion, of which 
over $800 million was disbursed in grants. Key financial activities of ATSIC with 
development implications include its business development and assistance program 
that approved loans and grants (but made no guarantees) valued at $37 million in 
2000–01; a home ownership program that approved 474 new loans with a value of $54 
million; and the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme, with a 
total cost of $437 million, and an unspecified part of its $157 million non-wages 
component available for capital expenditure. ATSIC also administers the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Land Fund, with a net asset base of $940 million at 30 June 
2001, and the Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA), with a net equity base of $58 million 
(ATSIC 2001). 
2. The Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC) is an independent statutory authority that was 
established to acquire and manage land for the economic, environmental, social or 
cultural benefits of Indigenous people. The ILC received $52 million in draw-downs 
from the land fund in 2000–01. Importantly, the ILC has powers to borrow and act as 
guarantor on loans. The ILC’s income stream is assured in perpetuity from draw-downs 
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from the land fund that will have an asset base exceeding $1.2 billion by 2005–06 (ILC 
2001; see also Altman & Pollack 2001). 
3. Indigenous Business Australia (IBA) is an independent statutory authority that aims to 
advance the commercial and economic interests of Indigenous Australians by using its 
capital assets for their benefit. IBA does not have an annual government appropriation, 
but has received $70 million since 1990, with an injection of $10 million in 1998–99. 
Typically, the IBA invests in joint ventures but then seeks to divest its share to 
Indigenous venture participants. The IBA can provide guarantee facilities. At 30 June 
2001 IBA had an asset base worth about $70 million, operating revenue of $8 million 
and operating profit of over $4 million. The IBA was involved in 23 principal 
investments and also approved a number of loans and guarantee facilities in 2000–01 
(IBA 2001). 
4. The Aboriginals Benefit Account (ABA) is a special account under the Commonwealth 
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997. The ABA had its origins in the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA) and receives income in the 
form of statutory royalty equivalents raised from mining operations on Aboriginal land 
in the Northern Territory. The ABA is administered by ATSIC and its activities are 
controlled by the federal government and managed by ATSIC. The ABA makes 
payments to land councils for their administrative expenses and for distribution to 
incorporated Aboriginal entities in areas affected by mining; and for the benefit of 
Aboriginal-incorporated entities in the Northern Territory generally. In 2000–01 the 
ABA made payments of $9.7 million to entities in areas affected and $2.1 million in 
general grants. The net accumulated assets of the ABA of $58 million are ultimately 
controlled by the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (ABA 2001). 
5. The NSW Statutory Investment Fund was established by the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 
1983 (NSW). Between 1983 and 1998, 7.5 per cent of the state land tax was provided to 
Aboriginal interests. Of $547 million allocated, $268 million was placed in a Statutory 
Investment Fund that earned $224 million and had a balance of $492 million at 31 
December 1998. The earnings from this fund are allocated to the Aboriginal land 
council system, but the capital base remains intact. A review on the future of this 
investment fund was instigated in 1999 and has yet to be completed (NSW Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) 1999). 
The sum total of all these available financial resources is not inconsiderable. All these 
organisations have assets that can be used to facilitate Indigenous business investment 
and a number have been successful in joint ventures in particular, but also in the purchase 
and divesting of properties and businesses to Indigenous interests. All of these 
organisations also face problems, including the following: 
• there is no link between resourcing and success 
• annual appropriations may be insufficient, so each has to husband resources 
cautiously and only invest in low-risk ventures 
• each organisation has considerable and highly variable objectives and jurisdictions, and 
options for joint action is limited 
• each is subject to restrictions that are ministerially imposed and may make little 
commercial sense 
• it is unclear if their substantial asset base can be fully utilised to back loans or 
guarantees or to jointly finance ventures with banks, and 
• there is some lack of appropriate transparency and communications with potential 
beneficiaries. 
An apparently sound financial proposal in 1998 to consolidate these ‘top’ five institutions to 
negotiate more effectively with mainstream financial institutions floundered politically, 
indicating a problem, namely, the fractured nature of the Indigenous commercial 
leadership, an issue that will be discussed further below (see Herron 1998a). 
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The Indigenous land base 
Indigenous Australians own between 15 and 18 per cent of Australia, although this land is 
very inequitably distributed on a State-by-State basis and has highly variable commercial 
worth (see Pollack 2001). Consequently, options for raising capital from this land are not 
just circumscribed, but vary enormously. There is a general view that Aboriginal land has 
limited value as collateral for raising commercial finance, even where this land can be sold, 
because its generally communal ownership can make sale legally difficult. But there is no 
doubt that some groups have been able to use their land ownership to negotiate income-
generating joint venture agreements. 
The Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation (BAC), a regional outstation resource 
agency and development corporation in central Arnhem Land, has one joint 
venture, Bawinanga Safaris, and one leased sports fishing venture. In each 
venture BAC has made investments in fixed assets while the non-Indigenous 
partner has invested heavily in movable assets, in generating industry goodwill, 
and in managing and operating the businesses. The former venture provides 
employment and trophy fees to traditional owners, the latter significant access 
fees. BAC has provided short-term licences to operate by investing in the 
venture and representing traditional owner interests. 
Similarly, there is a view that Aboriginal land cannot generate development capital, but this 
is clearly not the case when long-term lease agreements are made, as with a number of 
national parks. 
A number of national parks in the Northern Territory, such as Kakadu, Uluru, 
Nitmiluk and Gurig, are leased back to Commonwealth and Northern Territory 
park authorities under long-term, 99-year agreements. Each agreement has 
renegotiable financial clauses that see significant returns to traditional owners. 
The long-term nature of these agreements should make future income streams 
a potential source of collateral for raising commercial finance. 
The leasing of Aboriginal-owned land is an option for raising development finance, but 
obviously only in situations where there is a market demand for land access. Similarly, as 
will be shown below, resource agreements are frequently in the form of land access 
agreements that provide negotiated payments to landowners. Clearly though, in many 
situations, land is not a realisable asset for a lender, or else tradability is too fraught with 
sovereign and political risk. 
Program dollar streams 
Numerous community organisations participate in government programs, such as the 
CDEP scheme, that have potential to guarantee future income streams. This is especially 
the case when strategic and business planning has resulted in the negotiation of multi-year 
funding agreements with agencies. In such situations and with an adequate organisational 
track record, short-term overdraft facilities can be made with banks to underwrite business 
development. Such arrangements are highly dependent on very low-risk commercial 
opportunity and highly skilled organisational expertise, but when successfully negotiated 
can improve the credit worthiness of organisations over time.  
The BAC has leveraged its income stream from the CDEP scheme and trading 
surpluses to incrementally expand organisational investments into a number of 
community enterprises—a service station and store, commercial harvesting of 
wildlife—and into two joint ventures where it has provided the fixed assets. The 
BAC is generating a trading surplus annually that can now be re-invested in 
additional enterprise developments. Such investments have occurred without 
any access to Indigenous-specific business loan facilities (BAC 2002). 
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The levers: Consent and negotiation rights 
Historically, Indigenous interests had very limited leverage in negotiations with commercial 
interests and were almost entirely dependent on the public sector for development capital. 
In the 1970s, and especially since the passage of the ALRA, a precedent has been 
established in providing Indigenous interests some negotiating strength when development 
occurs on Aboriginal-owned land. This leverage was termed a ‘de facto’ property right by the 
Industry Commission in 1991 (Industry Commission 1991). In fact, in the ALRA, 
Indigenous interests have two forms of property right—one to statutory royalty equivalents 
guaranteed by law since 1952 (in the Northern Territory), and the other a right to negotiate 
above the statutory royalty. All mining agreements since 1978, when the financial elements 
of the ALRA were operationalised, have included statutory royalty equivalents and 
negotiated mining payments (Altman 1983). 
The agreement completed in 1978 between traditional owners of Nabarlek and 
the mining company Queensland Mines included a negotiated royalty that was 
267 per cent greater than the proportion of statutory royalty equivalent 
guaranteed by the ALRA (Altman 1983).3 
Other land rights laws have similarly provided Indigenous interests with options to benefit 
from mining or, in some cases, other commercial developments on Aboriginal land, 
although arguably no statute to date matches the ‘de facto’ property rights provisions in the 
ALRA.4 The Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) included a right to negotiate which was described at 
that time, and has subsequently proven to be, a weaker form of ‘de facto’ property right 
than that provided in land rights law (Altman 1993). The 1998 amendments to the NTA not 
only eliminated the right to negotiate in many situations, especially in urban areas, but 
also restricted the potential areas available for native title claim (Smith 1998). 
Levers to gain access to a share of resource rents are not just precipitated by statute. There 
is a growing recognition by developers that it is good business sense to negotiate with 
Indigenous interests, even in situations where native title has been historically 
extinguished or still requires legal determination. A number of significant long-term 
agreements in the Pilbara (Hammersley Iron), the Burrup Peninsula (Woodside), Western 
Cape York (Comalco), Goldfields (Annaconda) and the Gulf Region (Century Zinc, now 
Pasminco) are recent exemplars. 
The Century Mine Agreement completed in 1997 with a number of native title 
groups includes a significant and diverse benefits package provided by the 
mining company Pasminco, as well as by the Queensland government. This 
agreement extends over 20 years and, if strategically utilised, its guaranteed 
income stream could provide the Gulf Aboriginal Development Company and 
the Aboriginal Benefits Development Trust options to raise additional venture 
capital. 
Part of this business case is precipitated by vastly improved information flow today, but 
also because so many major companies operate globally and recognise that performance in 
one jurisdiction could influence future opportunities in another.  
There are clearly many issues that can be raised that focus not so much on what rent 
sharing can be negotiated in resource development agreements, but on how income flows 
that inevitably are a part of benefit packages might be utilised. But this lies well beyond the 
ambit of this paper (and workshop) and I merely point to a few issues that have arisen 
when seeking to use negotiated income flows as levers to raise development finance: 
• income streams that are dependent on royalties are inherently risky and unstable 
because resource development is risky business 
• there is a tendency for agreements to focus on income maximisation rather than on 
stable income streams, and 
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• agreement beneficiaries are often poorly defined, liable to change (usually expanding in 
number) and consequently liable to contestation and subsequent political instability. 
Inhibitors to financing Indigenous economic development 
The discussion above indicates that there are avenues for financing Indigenous economic 
development. But there is also evidence of some crucial inhibitors that in turn influence the 
willingness of the banking sector to commercially engage with Indigenous enterprise, 
especially at the community level. A few key inhibitors, in no particular order, are as 
follows: 
Economic reality 
As already noted, many discrete Indigenous communities are located in regional and 
remote areas where conventional commercial opportunities are heavily circumscribed. 
Under such circumstances, it is extremely important to clearly identify comparative 
advantage, while realistically taking into account Indigenous elements of the commercial 
environment. Too much viability assessment and business planning pays scant attention to 
distinct Indigenous elements of corporate structure and asset ownership. The very scale of 
discrete communities, almost all with populations of less than 1,000, means that they are 
disadvantaged in terms of institutional support and capacity to foster economic 
development in the most difficult Australian circumstances—structural disadvantage 
compounds historical legacy. Unless such communities are to be condemned not to 
participate in development, there is a need to explore how market failure, missing markets 
and potential future markets in these regions might be fostered or underwritten by 
government to allow appropriate development to occur (Altman 2002). 
Unclear property rights and contested aspirations 
There is evidence that even in situations where conventional economic development might 
occur—where there is comparative advantage in relation to mining or tourism, sometimes 
created by agreement-based concessions—political instability can undermine commercial 
success. This is usually a result of lack of clarity in property rights in land and resources, 
both within the Indigenous domain and interculturally. There is often a tension between 
property rights as defined in Australian law and in customary law. It is axiomatic that 
business investment and success is highly dependent on political stability, yet this is never 
evident if land ownership is contested or if proper consultation over development has not 
occurred. Under such circumstances there is a need for a high degree of regional consensus 
on development, and a crucial role for robust mediating institutions, like regional land 
councils, that will negotiate and indemnify commercial interests against future financial 
liability and legal challenge. 
Institutional fragmentation 
The benefits that could result from a strategic approach that unifies all the potential 
generators of Indigenous development finance identified above could be significant. But 
opportunities for productive investment can be foregone because Indigenous institutions 
are factionalised and the Indigenous polity is fractionalised and unable to operate in 
concert. This partly reflects normal political processes and associated vested interests and 
the complexities for Indigenous interests of operating under Australian federalism. 
Missing financial institutions 
A combination of the above three factors is resulting in a relatively low articulation between 
the commercial banking sector and the embryonic Indigenous business sector. These are 
barriers that profit-seeking banks have clearly identified and a form of market failure that 
government is currently reluctant to address. Under such circumstances, though, how can 
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enhanced Indigenous business development and engagement with the market—another 
plank of government policy—occur? The absence of banking facilities in many remote 
localities compounds existing development hurdles. Emerging enterprises lack access to 
rudimentary services such as deposit and withdrawal facilities that are taken for granted in 
metropolitan regions. They also lack access to ancillary business advisory services. Issues 
of scale and remoteness loom large here because even the largest discrete Indigenous 
communities have a level of consumer and commercial financial activity that cannot attract 
a permanent banking presence, let alone access to expert commercial expertise. This is a 
problem that Indigenous Australia shares with much of regional Australia, but more so. 
There is clearly a need for innovative approaches to provide commercial banking services to 
remote Indigenous communities, to gain preferential arrangements for Indigenous 
organisations. 
Some ways forward, some propositions 
There are success stories in the Indigenous corporate sector, at the regional and local 
levels, and it is important to recognise them, especially those of the last decade. Success is 
invariably predicated on comparative advantage, appropriate institutional design, strong 
leadership, robust governance, a degree of political stability and shared development 
aspirations among Indigenous people and, often, commercial leverage of some form—that is 
all. But clearly there is a need for much more widespread and robust economic 
development opportunities for Indigenous people and this will require strong linkages with 
the banking sector. 
The leadership needed to ensure progress will not emanate from one source. There is a 
need for state, Indigenous and corporate collaboration and joint action to ensure the 
paradigm shift that is needed to produce a different trajectory for Indigenous economic 
development, where sought by Indigenous people. It would be naïve, however, not to 
acknowledge that in some situations there may be commercial contestation both between 
and within these three broadly demarcated sectors. 
State governance for development 
Remote Australia is heavily underwritten by metropolitan Australia, but Australia’s fiscal 
federalism does not ensure that Indigenous development is underwritten equitably. There is 
an important role for governments in underwriting development futures and wealth 
creation for Indigenous people that recognises comparative advantage, market failure, 
missing markets, future markets, and the roles that Indigenous Australians living on their 
remote lands must play in the development future of the nation. I do not want to labour 
these points in detail, but merely note the following: 
• There is need for a far more transparent identification of state underwriting of non-
Indigenous business and industry in remote regions and an extension of such 
concessions to Indigenous interests in cases of market failure. 
• Consequently, there may be a need for the state to institutionalise community service 
obligations (by statute) on the banking sector, although given that commercial banking 
is a low-margin enterprise in remote regions (see below) this might need to be 
underwritten by the state. 
• There is a need to assist Indigenous people to gain access to and to invest in tradable 
assets. In particular, there is a need to increase Indigenous ownership of income-
generating and income-appreciating tradable assets, for example, rights in resources, 
fisheries, water and carbon credits. 
• There is a need to recognise the inalienability of the Indigenous land base as a positive 
in terms of sustainable development. 
• There is a need to recognise the crucial role that will be played by robust Indigenous 
regional institutions in development. 
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Indigenous governance for development 
As suggested above, there is a need for strong Indigenous leadership and governance for 
development, although this statement does not overlook the enormous challenge this 
represents for the Indigenous polity. This leadership and appropriate institutional design is 
needed at national, regional and community levels: 
• At the national level there is need for greater collaboration between existing Indigenous 
institutions, but also for alliance-building with mainstream business, including the 
banks. The financial leverage of Indigenous national institutions working in concert 
needs to be exerted to ensure best returns for Indigenous interests. 
• At the regional level there is a need for a more strategic regional approach to 
development that can be auspiced by robust regional institutions. As noted above, there 
is a role for government in facilitating the strengthening, rather than diminution, of 
regional institutions like land councils. In a complex world, there is a need for the 
critical mass and expertise that robust regional organisations can provide to ensure 
intercultural mediation between Indigenous interests, in all their diversity, and the 
market. Such institutions will play an important role in ensuring the level of political 
stability needed for development. 
• At the local level there is also a need for institutional strengthening to generate 
appropriately structured community development institutions that are commercially 
realistic and have the means to deliver local political stability; and that trade to 
generate a capital pool from the expenditure undertaken at remote communities. It is 
important that the multiplier effect of such income does not dissipate to non-Indigenous 
commercial interests, but is retained and accumulated locally for development 
purposes. 
The role for the corporate banking sector 
Finally, there is a need for a strategic engagement with the private sector. The Indigenous 
leadership must continue its efforts to influence the broader behaviour of financial 
institutions. The following three strategies may be considered: 
• Any possibilities for conjoined Indigenous and state leverage to enhance commercial 
banking support to Indigenous business should be pursued. Some banks are already 
providing philanthropic business advisory support to Indigenous communities. 
• Options for making a business case for an enhanced profile for banks, even on a remote 
regional basis, should be considered. Such a profile might be under the guise of an 
initial community service obligation, but may with time prove commercially profitable, 
especially if based on alliances between Indigenous and corporate interests. 
• There is a need for the banking sector to seriously consider the corporate citizenship 
and leadership provided by the mining industry in seeking to facilitate and underwrite 
sustainable economic futures for Indigenous communities. This is increasingly 
recognised as the means to ensure secure long-term licences to operate, while 
maintaining global competitive advantage. However, it is recognised that the extension 
of banking into the Indigenous sector in remote regions will be a low-margin enterprise. 
Conclusion 
This paper has set out to frankly discuss some innovative approaches to generate finance 
for Indigenous economic development. In particular, it seeks to assess how Indigenous 
assets and statutory rights might be used within the constraints of Australia’s political 
economy and fiscal federalism. It has become amply apparent in this paper that access to 
development capital is only a part of the answer to the development problems of Indigenous 
Australians, especially in remote regions. While without doubt there is a role for the 
commercial banking sector in facilitating Indigenous economic development, it is 
contestable whether this is even a first order issue, given existing options and other 
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fundamentals that have to be addressed. The paper suggests that parallel action is needed 
by the state, the Indigenous sector and the corporate sector to ensure progress in this area. 
Government seems to be doing little to ensure commercial banking services are available 
for remote Indigenous interests. Under such circumstances, corporate leadership by the 
banking sector, to match that taken by key mining corporates in the native title era, would 
be one possibility. However, a strong business case needs to be made to encourage such 
leadership. It is perhaps incumbent on the Indigenous leadership to make this case using 
the significant Indigenous asset base as the lever for ‘community service obligations’ to be 
met by banks. There is no doubt, however, that there are many existing opportunities for 
development progress in the Indigenous sector and every effort should be made to ensure 
that existing institutional and statutory frameworks are strengthened to hasten success.
Notes 
1. For an interesting Ecuadorian industry-based case study see Colloredo-Mansfield (2002). 
2. See Hunter (1999) for the most recent analysis of this issue. 
3. See also Altman & Smith (1994) for a discussion of how these moneys were utilised between 
1980 and 1993.  
4. For a wide ranging recent compilation of the issues see Nettheim, Meyers & Craig (2002). 
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